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aircraft then departed for friendly
fields in Germany—leaving the ground
element to get out of France on its
own. The account of the latter’s trek
across France—in an eclectic convoy of
vehicles with cobbled-together armaments and increasingly diverse groups
of personnel who joined during the
retreat—makes for fascinating reading.
The trip was not without danger, and
several firefights erupted between group
personnel and French resistance units.
Yet for all the excellent detail that
Shadow over the Atlantic provides
concerning FAGr-5, the human element
is lacking. The planes and the operations
are the center of attention; the men of
the group are identified only rarely.
There is the occasional mention of
encouraging sports to boost morale or
how the loss of a crew was unfortunate,
but in the end the vast majority of the
men of FAGr-5 are simply ciphers.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory, by Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, USA
(Ret.). Foreword by General Martin Dempsey,
USA (Ret.). Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky,
2016. 238 pages. $50.

Writer, lecturer, retired general officer,
and PhD, James Dubik has made a
significant contribution to military
scholarship and the practice of war
fighting with this book. He has introduced a major revision in just war
theory that undoubtedly will transform
the viewpoint of supporters and critics
on this philosophical tradition in applied
ethics. Dubik understands that his
proposed revision will not answer all
objections and naturally will be subject
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to claims of deficiencies and other
criticisms, but he rightly argues that his
revised defense of the just war tradition
advances a new perspective—one
that undeniably will alter the way in
which current and future generations
interpret the justification of war.
Demonstrating a mastery of detail
and a clarity of understanding, Dubik
persuasively employs the methodology
of historiography to support and defend
his war-waging principles, basing
them on examples from the Civil War,
World War II, the Vietnam War, and
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This
methodological technique, reminiscent
of Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations (Basic Books, 1977), is both
convincing and engaging for those who
study history and the art of war. By
contrast with those who are academics
and stress concepts primarily and praxis
secondarily, as well as with those who
are warfighters and stress praxis primarily and concepts secondarily, Dubik is a
former Army general who experienced
the challenges of warfare, yet is now a
professor at Georgetown University. He
balances both theory and practice in Just
War Reconsidered, his magnum opus.
Although Dubik respects and acknowledges the profound contribution to just
war theory made by Walzer—as part of
a long line of philosophers and theologians, including Aristotle, Augustine,
Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius,
to name only a few—he criticizes the
customary separation of jus ad bellum
(justice in going to war) and jus in bello
(justice in waging war). Walzer presents
the usual understanding: that senior civil
leaders debate the criteria that justify
going to war, represented by jus ad bellum, and then, once a national decision
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has been reached, it is the primary
responsibility of senior military leaders
to fight the war in accordance with jus
in bello norms. Convincingly, through
historical references and extrapolations,
Dubik demonstrates that successful
wars have been won not only on the
basis of tactical excellence but also on
the strategic merit that both civil and
military leaders have provided. Dubik
insists that just war proponents have
focused exclusively on the tactical
dimension of jus in bello, thereby
omitting the strategic facet of waging
war, including the necessary public
legitimation, determination of end-state
goals, provision of logistical support,
and preparation for reconstruction.
The five principles laid out—continuous
dialogue, final decision authority,
managerial competence, war legitimacy,
and resignation—presuppose the classic
benchmarks of proportionality and
discrimination in jus in bello, but these
additional five strategic components fill
in the gap of what is tragically lacking
in the standard just war formulation.
When senior civil and military leaders
fail to optimize strategic coordination
of war via a dynamic partnership
involving intense dialogue, the costs
of war escalate in both economic and
human-casualty terms, rendering
those leaders who squandered the war
efforts morally culpable. Unforgettably,
General Dempsey in his foreword
asserts that one of the most important
and haunting lines from the entire
book consists of these few words: “The
difficulty of conditions that may mitigate
responsibility does not erase it” (p. viii).
Dubik’s critique is not a replacement
of Walzer’s ideas defending just war
but rather an addendum that augments
the value of strategic planning and
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cooperation between civil and military
leaders. On reflection, a reader might
question whether the strategic aspect
of jus in bello might not exist already,
to some extent, within jus ad bellum,
considering military advisement as
part of the moral calculation of proportionality and probability of success.
Additionally, the reader might wonder
whether the acceptable range across the
military operations continuum would be
determined best if the strategic dialogue
and robust collaboration between
civil and military leadership that Dubik
champions went on not only as part of
jus in bello but at every stage of war and
peace. For instance, the war-waging
principle of continuous dialogue also
might apply to jus ante bellum (justice
before war: strategic planning to shape
fragile states so as to prevent war),
jus ad bellum (justice in going to war:
debating all nonkinetic and military
options), and jus post bellum (justice
after war: planning for reconstruction)
to achieve jus pax (just peace).
Overall, Dubik’s strategic supplement
to the category of jus in bello is a
legacy that posterity will credit respectfully to the experience and wisdom of
a distinguished scholar and warrior.
EDWARD ERWIN

Never Call Me a Hero: A Legendary American
Dive-Bomber Pilot Remembers the Battle of Midway, by N. Jack Kleiss, with Timothy Orr and
Laura Orr. New York: William Morrow, 2017. 336
pages. $26.99.

June 4, 1942, stands out as one of the
most pivotal moments in American
naval history. The events of that day
continue to be analyzed, scrutinized, and
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